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ABSTRACT 
Law and technology matters have traditionally been researched in 
discrete categories such as intellectual property (e.g., copyright, 
patent, or trademark) or intermediary liability and responsibility (e.g., 
secondary liability and telecommunications regulation). In the last 
two decades, however, academics have studied the broader 
interaction between law and technology across legal fields. This 
Article examines progress to date and discusses two distinct 
perspectives on law and technology. 
 
The dominant approach has been an instrumentalist one that treats 
technology as a tool for individuals to use while downplaying its 
broader social implications. However, the fields of philosophy of 
technology, science and technology studies, and social studies of 
science are now mature enough to support a rival approach grounded 
in a deep understanding of the nature—rather than the results—of 
technological change. This substantivist approach suggests analytical 
principles to refine and improve technology law and policy in ways 
that rival, instrumentalist approaches have neglected. For instance, 
substantivist commitments support a law and technology construct 
called a “digital persona” to emphasize the need for laws and policies 
to promote autonomy within the online world. By contrasting 
instrumentalist and substantivist approaches, we demonstrate new 
ways to integrate ethics, policy, and law in the digital age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between law and technology has traditionally 
been scrutinized in discrete categories such as intellectual property 
(e.g., copyright, patents, or trademarks) or intermediary liability and 
responsibility (e.g., secondary liability and telecommunications 
regulation). By studying law and technology issues as matters that 
should be relegated to such conceptually sealed boxes, legal 
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scholarship has sometimes promoted a body of doctrine that is 
unfinished and inadequately informed. 
For example, consider the extraordinary rise of legal immunities 
for online intermediaries. In the case of Internet companies, Google 
and Facebook have serially won key copyright, trademark, and 
antitrust cases. In the U.S., Google and Facebook have asserted free 
expression immunities when sued for business torts, and they have 
avoided classification as a “consumer reporting agency” under 
relevant privacy laws, despite employers’ and bankers’ use of them to 
assess reliability and creditworthiness of applicants.1 Each of these 
decisions may have been correct as a matter of law. 
But what happens when a critical mass of close cases combines 
with network effects to give a few firms incredible power over our 
personal information about events, commerce, potential friends and 
soulmates, and more? What happens when these few firms and online 
social networks turn personal data against users themselves? What 
happens when foreign forces use the platforms built by these firms to 
influence elections by microtargeting users based on their own 
personal data? What happens when individuals’ real lives are 
increasingly interwoven with their digital personhood and hence they 
increasingly suffer discrimination via unfair social sorting? Legal–
academic culture is very good at analysis but oft adrift when it comes 
to synthesis. Specialization obscures the larger context. Authorities 
around the world are now struggling with this problem, and scholars 
are searching for a more holistic perspective on technology law and 
policy.2  
These questions are all the more urgent now that some 
technologists bill smart contracts, block chains, and other forms of 
automation as ways of replacing law with technology.3 The composite 
movements of #legaltech, #fintech, #regtech, and #insurtech have 
raised the stakes of regulation of new technologies. No longer is the 
                                                   
 1. See Section IV.C and accompanying notes. 
 2. For a discussion of similar themes, see generally Kieran Tranter, 
Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 449 (2007); Sanya Burgess, Big Tech Companies Threaten Our Democracy, 
Warns EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, NAT’L (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/big-tech-companies-threaten-our-
democracy-warns-eu-commissioner-margrethe-vestager-1.673711 
[https://perma.cc/8NGK-BJNS]; Nitasha Tiku, Al Franken Just Gave the Speech Big 
Tech Has Been Dreading, WIRED (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/al-
franken-just-gave-the-speech-big-tech-has-been-dreading/ [https://perma.cc/DL4V-
WMS2]. 
 3. Examining the Innovative Technologies Being Used To Change the Way 
Financial Services are Provided and the Financial System Operates, 115th Cong. 66, 
76 (2017) (citing a statement from Professor Frank Pasquale). 
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question one of degree: How much should law and policy attempt to 
channel, limit, or encourage the development and dissemination of a 
technology? Rather, technology may usurp critical aspects of law, 
policy, and trusted institutions. Taken too far, the vertiginous 
possibility here is a demand that law itself submit to the dictates of 
technological development rather than encoding and enacting the 
values meant to shape technology. 
Two paths of the field of law and technology illuminate how we 
have come to this impasse and how we might escape from it. An 
instrumentalist literature tends to consider both law and technology as 
means to ends: Technologies should be adopted as long as they 
promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency.4 
A rival approach models each as constitutive of certain social 
domains—that is, not merely one of many ways to order such domains 
but as critically affirming or distorting the ways in which human 
participants in a social order conceive of themselves and their 
activity.5 We call such an approach substantivist to contrast it with the 
instrumentalist school. 
Instrumentalism’s main tools of analysis are methodologically 
individualistic social sciences, such as economics and psychology. 
Instrumentalism focuses on individual disputes and fits more naturally 
with court cases that are both retrospective and specific. 
Substantivism, by contrast, draws on more holistic disciplines such as 
political science, philosophy, social theory, anthropology, and 
sociology. It reflects the broader, more substantive impacts of 
technology on individuals and their communities, including political 
and social perspectives. 
Unsurprisingly, instrumentalism is dominant in the Western 
world. However, its dominance is not necessarily founded on it being 
a better approach than substantivism. The fields of philosophy of 
technology, science and technology studies, and social studies of 
science are now mature enough to support a canonical set of 
approaches to recurrent regulatory and legal dilemmas. Substantivism 
also fits better with administrative rulemaking processes, which are by 
nature polycentric and prospective. Such holistic thinking is necessary 
in order to preserve human values in a legitimate way in an 
increasingly technologized world. 
                                                   
 4. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL 
THEORY REVISITED 5 (2002) (describing the instrumentalist theory of the relationship 
between law and technology). 
 5. See id. at 6-7 (describing an alternative view of the relationship and 
purpose of law and technology). 
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To support this claim, we explore how a substantivist vision of 
law and technology constructs and protects what can increasingly be 
called our digital persona, a broader notion than the normal focus on, 
say, digital identity within privacy law. A digital persona is essentially 
an online avatar of a real person whose life is interwoven within the 
digital world. Personhood is the self, and our minds are a mirror of 
how we are treated, including how our digital persona is treated.6 
At this juncture in time, the online world is at a turning point. 
Will it continue to allow powerful forces of commerce, domestic and 
foreign governments, and malignant individuals to track us, 
discriminate against us, shape our thinking, and undermine our 
democratic institutions? Or will the online world free us of earthly 
structure so that the digital persona can travel on its journey relatively 
unmolested by these forces? The substantivist perspective of law and 
technology shows how law and policy can advance the latter goal. The 
digital persona model helps to understand the need for a conceptual 
shift away from the normally reactive focus on protecting identity 
(e.g., privacy laws that try to inhibit what third parties know about us) 
to a more proactive effort to protect our minds from manipulation or 
excessive influence as we navigate the online world. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses historical 
approaches to studying law and technology, as well as how these 
approaches fail to illuminate important policy considerations in many 
circumstances. Part II describes how cyberlaw writings provided a 
first attempt by legal scholars to critically examine the broader 
relationship between law and technology, while nevertheless being 
rooted in a primarily instrumental vision of this relationship. Part III 
discusses how a substantivist perspective of technology can better 
identify critical policy concerns in a world increasingly mediated by 
complex technologies. Further, Part III reviews the different theories 
and perspectives supporting instrumentalism and substantivism as 
well as recent social scientific analysis of technological determinism. 
Part IV revisits cyberlaw analysis from a substantivist perspective, 
sets out our model based on the digital persona, and provides a case 
study of free expression online in the age of bots to show how this 
perspective can illuminate under-explored areas of policy concern. 
Part V concludes that broader forms of legal analysis, supported by 
mature social science theories of technology, can offer insight into 
guidelines and analytical frameworks at the intersection of law and 
technology. 
                                                   
 6. See CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
183-84 (1902) (discussing how individuals form their personal identity).  
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I. LAW AND TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 
Before addressing historical developments surrounding law and 
technology, some terminological clarification is in order. Both law and 
technology are notoriously contested concepts. For example, a spoon 
is a technology for eating, but there have been few, if any, sustained 
reflections on cutlery as technology in the past century or so. That is 
because in common parlance, our common sense of the technological 
carries with it a clarifying sensibility that it usually only makes sense 
to apply the term to objects which are relatively new ways of 
accomplishing tasks.7 Discussing the “Hapi-Fork,” a fork that 
electronically buzzes once its wielder has eaten a certain number of 
bites, under the rubric of technology makes more sense than applying 
that category to a fork simpliciter. 
While the core of law is better defined than technology, it also 
has fuzzy edges. For example, the great legal theorist John Chipman 
Gray characterized even a statute as merely a source of law and not 
law itself, which was the exclusive province of courts to articulate.8 
That particular distinction has faded in the past century, as statutes 
have become more ubiquitous and detailed, and agencies make policy 
judgments in order to clarify statutes. But as any student of U.S. 
administrative law knows, the distinction between agency rules with 
the force and effect of law and mere guidance or interpretive rules is 
not always clear to either courts or the regulated community.9 
Nevertheless, such ambiguities do not make law a meaningless or 
arbitrary concept. Rather, they should instead caution analysts to be 
                                                   
 7. For different views and definitions of technology, see, e.g., EDWARD 
TENNER, OUR OWN DEVICES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF BODY TECHNOLOGY ix (2003). 
Tenner discusses the complementary principle of “technique,” or how the 
modification of the environment is used in performance. See id. Changes in behavior 
resulting from technology innovations inspires new hardware, which generates more 
innovations. See id. He discusses the theories of Jacques Ellul, who argued that 
modern human society is so swamped by technologies that technology and technique 
are now inseparable. See id. at 4-5. For further discussion of Ellul’s views, see infra 
Subsection III.A.3. Different academic disciplines have chosen to approach the 
somewhat controversial definition of technology in different ways. For example, 
Strategic Technology Analysis, as part of a broader management theory, defines 
technology as “created competence . . . expressed in technological entities consisting 
of devices, procedures, and acquired human skills.” Rias J. van Wyk, Technology: A 
Fundamental Structure?, 15 KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 14, 19 (2002). 
 8. See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE 
LAW (1909). Many thanks to Peter Quint for this reference. 
 9. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions, Office of the 
Attorney Gen. on Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1012271/download 
[https://perma.cc/4QLZ-UAQ6]. 
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aware of the multifaceted nature of law before presuming to propound 
theories of law tout court. Mindful of the vital role of history and 
timing in the definition of technology and the articulation of law, we 
introduce in this section emblematic examples of legal systems and 
scholars struggling to apply legal principles to new and emerging 
technologies.  
A. Historical Legal Approaches to Technology 
Law has always addressed technological development, since 
new modes of life and affordances so often precipitate conflict. 
Intellectual property law provides a good example of such struggles. 
Before the invention of the printing press, it was relatively laborious 
to duplicate and disseminate any particular text.10 The inefficiency of 
hand printing provided a natural limit to the number of copies of any 
given work that could be distributed by someone without permission 
of the original author. The same logic applied to descriptions of ways 
of doing things or new products.  
Lawmakers and judges struggled to balance the interests of 
inventors who created new technologies against the rights of those 
affected by the technologies, ranging from inventors and authors to 
copyists and readers to ordinary citizens. In fifteenth-century England, 
for instance, the invention of the printing press led to new ways about 
thinking of the role of authors and publishers.11 Shortly after the 
invention of the printing press, a concept of individual work began to 
spread through society. Technical affordances of widespread copying 
and distribution helped generate new ideas of commodification. 
By 1493, printers and authors in England and Venice were 
asking for exclusive rights to print and disseminate their works, laying 
the foundations of copyright law.12 These new rights were 
accompanied by the growth of censorship laws as medieval rulers and 
church authorities sought to control both the content of printed 
manuscripts as well as the content-producers themselves.13 More 
recently, while intellectual property law has flourished and grown over 
the past century in the West, free expression law has undercut 
                                                   
 10. See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF 
CHANGE xvi (14th ed. 2009). 
 11. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “Une Chose Publique”? The Author’s Domain 
and the Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 639 (2006). 
 12. See Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair 
Use, 60 OCTOBER 82, 84-88 (1992). 
 13. See id. at 85. 
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censorship as a form of control of information in these same 
societies.14 
From these earlier roots arose the traditional categories of 
intellectual property law—patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
Sherman and Bently discuss how these developments were derived 
through complex social processes involving business lobbying, 
Victorian sensibilities, and judicial misunderstanding of certain 
scientific principles.15 Despite this uneven start, the categorization 
clearly had a massive influence on subsequent legal developments.16  
Later on, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed an 
explosion of laws responding to the industrial revolution. Technology 
change had provoked a new machine society fueled by the 
development of machine production and machine transportation such 
as steam engine boats.17 In their wake, different legal innovations were 
introduced, including labor laws (in particular the creation of child 
labor laws and workplace accident laws), housing policies due to 
overcrowded cities, pollution regulation, and “poor laws” (i.e., welfare 
laws that sought to provide financial relief to destitute families).  
A number of works have reviewed the birth of railroads within 
this new machine society and how this innovation provoked legal 
changes to accommodate the new forms of transportation and its 
required infrastructure.18 The changing laws also sought to account 
for, promote, or ignore, the interests of consumers and government-
imposed shipping fees, farmers whose lands were expropriated for 
railway passage, and the powerful railroad companies themselves.19 
                                                   
 14. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, THE GROWTH OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
A HISTORY OF THE OWNERSHIP OF IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/77YD-
WFEV]. 
 15. See generally BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760-1911 (1999).  
 16. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual 
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2190 (2000).  
 17. See Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: 
Steam Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, J. TORT L. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090636 
[https://perma.cc/YV4L-PNY6]; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL 
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN LAW 2 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 53 (2002); STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: 
BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, at 382 (2002). 
 19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 18; see also USSELMAN, supra note 18 
(discussing, from a historical perspective, U.S. government efforts to regulate railway 
innovations, including how regulatory decisions reinforced certain interests). 
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As technology became more interwoven with the lives of 
individuals and their communities, Western legal norms began to 
slowly adapt to these developments. Sherman and Bently further note 
that, by the mid- to late-nineteenth century, traditional doctrine could 
not properly adapt to technological developments, and English 
intellectual property law became more abstract and forward looking 
by moving away from a reactive and case specific analysis of the law 
surrounding “mental labour.”20 In a world increasingly mediated by 
complex technologies, we now turn to our claim for the need for an 
ongoing evolution toward holistic analysis of the intersection of law 
and technology. 
B. Blind Spots in Historical Legal Approaches to Technology 
Legal responses to both the rise of the printing press and the 
industrial revolution bear similar hallmarks. Courts and lawmakers 
were largely reactive to technological developments.21 They seemed 
reluctant to enact or develop new laws at the introduction of new 
technologies, despite the danger that new uses of technologies could 
violate public values or destabilize valued social arrangements. Nor 
were they keen on setting new laws or developing new ways of 
thinking that envisioned the development of related future 
technologies.22 As a result, when issues dealing with new technologies 
reached legislatures or courts, the lawmakers or judges tended to fit 
the new technology into pre-existing categories; these efforts were 
later identified by cyberlaw scholars as trying to fit “new wine into old 
bottles.”23  
Legal scholars subject laws to deliberation and review. 
However, technological developments that accompany these legal 
changes have less frequently been subject to such scrutiny and 
challenge. This occurs despite the fact that “[c]hanges in technology 
affect people’s ability to produce, consume[,] and exchange goods just 
                                                   
 20. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
 21. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 
MAN. L.J. 383, 398, 407-09 (2004) (discussing the need for broader theories and 
perspectives on law and technology). 
 22. For discussion, see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological 
Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the 
Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1012-15 (1997). 
 23. See infra notes 66-68 (showing the Easterbrook–Lessig exchange and 
how it generated significant discussion, including discussions about cyberlaw 
teaching). See, e.g., Marci Wilson, Is Internet Law a Discreet Practice or Just Old 
Wine in a New Bottle?, 19 OF COUNSEL, at 9 (Oct. 9, 2000); Renato Mariotti, 
Cyberspace in Three Dimensions, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 251, 262-63 (2005). 
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as surely as a change in laws or regulations.”24 Accordingly, 
technology change can be subjected to ethical evaluation similar to the 
approach within legal analysis.  
A more critical examination of the interplay between law and 
technology is necessary as technological developments determine 
certain paths and influence human behavior, often in unanticipated 
ways.25 As Marshall McLuhan pointed out, “we become what we 
behold[;] we shape our tools and afterwards our tools shape us.”26 Max 
Weber similarly noted that when we surrender our goals and social 
practices to technologies, it forms an “iron cage” that restricts efforts 
to obtain desired policy objectives.27  
As our lives become more entwined with technology, 
technology exerts more influence on our values, norms, interests, and 
culture.28 Embedded technologies are particularly powerful, 
presenting greater resistance to change.29 Improvements in technology 
are double edged; some promote social interests by permitting 
individuals to enjoy wealthier and healthier lives, but others lead to 
socially ambivalent or even disastrous results. Moreover, there is no 
obvious final accounting for the balance of harm and help for many 
critical technologies. Advances in surveillance technology have 
arguably promoted state security, but enhanced surveillance could also 
                                                   
 24. PAUL B. THOMPSON, JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHICS ISSUES IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 123 (2002). Part of this phenomenon is a 
consequence of the social acceleration of time, which undermines the effectiveness of 
legislative, regulatory, and judicial interventions in many areas. See WILLIAM 
SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 1 
(2004). 
 25. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF 
MAN 23 (1994). 
 26. Id. at xxi. McLuhan theorized that media, in the beginning, acts as 
extensions of people, but over time people become extensions of media. See id. When 
the technology is pushed to its limit, it becomes the driver of social change or the 
message itself. See id. 
 27. LAWRENCE A. SCAFF, FLEEING THE IRON CAGE: CULTURE, POLITICS, AND 
MODERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 5 (1989).  
 28. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY 
LIFE 1-2 (2001); MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD 3-4 (1999); MANUEL 
CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY: THE INFORMATION AGE—ECONOMY, SOCIETY 
AND CULTURE 1-2 (1997).  
 29. See Thomas P. Hughes, Technological Momentum, in DOES 
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 112 
(Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994) (“A technological system can be both a 
cause and an effect; it can shape or be shaped by society. As they grow larger and 
more complex, systems tend to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it.”). 
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undermine important democratic values like freedom of expression.30 
The acceleration of technological development also undermines 
society’s ability to shape its adaptation to these developments, as they 
overwhelm the bottlenecks of legislatures and courts.31 
Technology’s role in modulating, shaping, and chilling opinion 
was not top of mind for those advancing it to deter terrorism or crime.32 
But such effects, now reliably documented, should inform future 
deployments of surveillance, ranging from gait and iris recognition to 
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)-chipping. A law-and-
technology perspective or theory can help us to understand the ways 
that technological developments can either subvert their own ends, 
undermine other policy goals, or transform our understanding of social 
realities and relationships. Technology is increasingly interwoven 
with our social, political, economic, and cultural fabric. Laws that 
respond to (or fail to respond to) technological change will 
increasingly have an impact on important values and interests.33 
Moreover, the traditional compartmentalization approach may inhibit 
progress toward a deeper and more nuanced understanding of law and 
technology. Wagner has noted that courts have struggled with limited 
success to apply legal precedents to disputes involving emerging 
technologies and “[i]n many cases, those law-and-technology issues 
that have been addressed have been resolved only partially or 
inconclusively.”34 Complementing these doctrinal silos, narrow 
                                                   
 30. See Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Privacy in an Era of Asymmetrical 
Social Control, in BIG DATA, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 31-35 (Aleš Zavrašnik ed., 
2018); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 168-69, 175-81 (2015). 
 31. See HARTMUT ROSA, SOCIAL ACCELERATION: A NEW THEORY OF 
MODERNITY 261 (2013) (discussing the challenges to politics and law when 
“[i]nnovation cycles (the time between a scientific or technological invention and its 
introduction to the market) and product cycles (the lifetime of a given model) have 
been accelerated so much in certain sectors (for instance, in entertainment electronics 
and, to some extent, even in the automobile industry) that often even the dealer is 
unable to identify the most up-to-date product, let alone the consumer”). 
 32. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Surveillance as Law, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 795, 
801-08 (2011) (discussing how Surveillance Studies assesses, among other things, the 
broader social impact of post-9/11 government surveillance). 
 33. This view is consistent with views of observers who assert that 
technology developments cannot be separated from social, cultural, economic and 
political processes. To a certain extent, this view departs from what has been called 
the instrumental theory of technology where technologies should be adopted as long 
as they promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency. For discussion, see 
ANDREW FEENBERG, CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY 5 (1991).  
 34. Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust, and the Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
1073, 1075 (2000). 
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methodological focuses have also occluded a more holistic 
perspective on the interaction between law and technology and their 
broader societal impact.35 
An alternate emerging approach is to examine the ways that 
traditional doctrinal categories of the law—torts, criminal law, 
contracts, property—interact with the specific technologies.36 More 
recent law-and-technology writings are sensitive to the substantive 
impact of technology on interests the law has traditionally sought to 
protect.37 If technology threatens these interests, these perspectives 
sometimes call for judicial approaches that are less deferential to 
precedent and legislative empowerment of agencies with flexible and 
broad mandates to monitor and channel the development of 
technology. 
II. THE RISE OF CYBERLAW 
Cyberlaw has featured both the instrumentalist and substantivist 
approaches to technology. This school began as scholars emphasized 
new ways of thinking about the relationship between law and 
technology.38 Though instrumentalist approaches have dominated the 
field, we will explore how more substantivist approaches have always 
been a leitmotif and should become more important as the full 
consequences of digitization become more apparent. 
The roots of cyberlaw began with a more narrow focus on 
computer and telecommunication technologies.39 Laurence Tribe’s 
Channeling Technology Through Law was a very early casebook on 
law and technology.40 In 1971, seven American lawyers formed a 
computer law group to study how developments in computer 
                                                   
 35. See generally Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and 
Technological Change?, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589 (2007).  
 36. See id. at 594.  
 37. See infra Section IV.B.  
 38. See generally PATRICIA L. BELLIA, PAUL S. BERMAN, & DAVID G. POST, 
CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2d 
ed. 2004).  
 39. We are grateful to Dag Spicer, Senior Curator at the Computer History 
Museum in Mountain View, California, for providing us with this background. In July 
2017, the Computer History Museum began to curate the historic conference 
proceedings of the ITechLaw Association along with selected law and technology 
journals. See COMPUT. LAW ASS’N, GUIDE TO THE COMPUTER LAW ASSOCIATION 
RECORDS (1982-2005), http://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/ 
finding-aids/102733964-CLA/102733964-CLA.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7DH-7XRJ] 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
 40. LAURENCE TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 5 (1973). 
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technologies were interacting with legal developments.41 They 
initially started to meet in different East Coast states, and the 
organization quickly grew in size. In 1973, the group was incorporated 
into the non-profit Computer Law Association (CLA).42 The CLA held 
several national and international conferences each year, including its 
annual Computer Law Update (later renamed the World Computer and 
Internet Law Congress), conducted workshops, and also published 
periodicals and reports on computer law.43 As international 
membership grew, the CLA changed its name in 2006 to the 
International Technology Law Association, or ITechLaw; it continues 
to hold conferences around the world and publish related academic 
journals.44 
By the mid-1990s, the study of computer law morphed into the 
study of “cyberlaw” or “cyberspace law.”45 Cyberlaw, which typically 
focuses on information technology and Internet developments, was an 
early attempt by legal scholars as a group to discuss general principles 
and theories surrounding the relationship between law and technology. 
A reason for such extensive discussion was the fact that the Internet 
merged (within one online forum) seemingly endless forms of social 
and commercial interaction, and thus implicated a wide range of laws: 
free speech, privacy, contracts, legal jurisdiction, intellectual property, 
and many other fields. 
In reaction, legal academics struggled to understand how this 
complex stew of activities would mesh with law. This Part reviews 
two core cyberlaw debates that were carried forward within 
subsequent law and technology discussions: whether the Internet and 
cyberspace were so new they required entirely new ways about 
thinking about the law, and in what situations lawmakers should seek 
to regulate code to pursue policy goals.  
                                                   
 41. COMPUT. LAW ASS’N, supra note 39. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. In the U.S., for classroom purposes, computer law casebooks were 
revised into cyberlaw casebooks. In addition, the first cyberlaw casebook that 
grappled exclusively with legal issues surrounding the Internet was published. See 
RAYMOND S. R. KU, MICHELE A. FARBER, & ARTHUR J. COCKFIELD, CYBERSPACE 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002). The American Association of Law Schools 
finally changed the name of its Section on Computer Law to “Internet and Computer 
Law.” 
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A.  Is Cyberspace a New Space Requiring New Laws? 
Prior to the rise of the Internet, author William Gibson coined 
the word “cyberspace” in a short story.46 In his later novel 
Neuromancer, Gibson elaborated on his vision of our future, a world 
increasingly mediated by computers: “Cyberspace. A consensual 
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in 
every nation . . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the 
banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable 
complexity.”47  
Early Internet users who were familiar with Gibson’s works 
likely adopted the word “cyberspace.” As we explore in our discussion 
of the digital persona below, Gibson’s vision of cyberspace appears 
increasingly relevant as virtual reality technologies and haptic suits 
progressively allow users to “jack in” to the Internet for a more organic 
mental experience. This ongoing complex meshing of real personhood 
with digital personhood calls for proactive and holistic legal and 
policy protections for the latter, including possible reforms to human 
rights law.48 
Gibson’s dystopian vision of our future and its cyberpunk ethics 
likely played well with these early Internet participants who valued 
the complete freedom of their online experiences and considered 
themselves pioneers in an untamed online universe. For example, John 
Perry Barlow adopted the term in his well-known A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace, a call to arms against what he viewed as 
the unwarranted intrusion of government regulation into Internet 
matters.49 Notably, Barlow’s and other early views focused on the need 
to protect our minds against outside influence during online 
experiences.50 Unfortunately, the common focus on government as the 
chief agent of tyranny left many other problems unaddressed. 
Barlow’s brash libertarianism was rendered obsolete, as it became 
clear that spontaneous order is about as rare on the Internet as it is 
                                                   
 46. See WILLIAM GIBSON, BURNING CHROME 176 (1986). 
 47. See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984). 
 48. See Lawrence M. Friedman, On Planetary Law, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 213, 
214, 220 (2018) (discussing how global digital technologies are encouraging a 
convergence in human rights laws); see also Marta Poblet & Jonathan Kolieb, 
Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges, 
54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259, 262 (2018) (discussing how digital tools can support human 
rights laws). 
 49. See generally John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence 
[https://perma.cc/3WAP-LD63]. 
 50. See id. 
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elsewhere in human affairs.51 Despite the naïve politics that promoted 
its early adoption, the term “cyberspace” eventually entered the 
general lexicon. 
What does cyberspace mean to lawyers and the legal academy? 
Some commentators have used the term interchangeably with the term 
“Internet,” while others associate cyberspace with the software 
technologies that enable Internet communications. Katsh notes that 
online forms of interaction between individuals and other people or 
businesses are substitutes for physical places, and hence cyberspace 
experiences are transformed into a culture with values, norms and 
expectations about acquiring, exchanging, using, and processing 
information in some ways analogous to those of physical places.52 
Similarly, the dynamic change and internal diversity of the Internet, 
along with the complex interdependent interactions among law, 
norms, cyberspace and the network, have been analogized to a “digital 
biosphere.”53 A digital persona’s life journey through the digital 
biosphere model helps to show that, as technology becomes more 
pervasive in our lives, it becomes interwoven with our norms in a 
complex, interactive, and dynamic—almost organic—relationship.54 
Though some critical populations are cut off from many of its 
features, the digital biosphere is international. Thus, some 
commentators have pointed out the drawbacks of applying territory-
based regulatory models to the brave new world of cyberspace.55 Their 
work suggests that the old world of regulating atoms has little to offer 
a world of bits and bytes that zip about the planet. For example, David 
Johnson and David Post have staked out a broadly cyberlibertarian 
position.56 Johnson and Post’s early work argued that the regulation of 
cyberspace must necessarily be different from the regulation of real 
space because cyberspace does not have territorial boundaries, but 
rather it exists simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions.57 They 
asserted that the cost and speed of the transmission of data on the 
Internet is almost entirely independent of physical location, and users 
                                                   
 51. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO RULES THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS 
OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 131-33 (2006); see also James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, 
Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACE L. REV. 135, 144, 146 (2015). 
 52. See M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual 
Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 353 (1996). 
 53. Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: 
How the Internet Is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 334 (2002).  
 54. See id.; see also infra Section IV.B.  
 55. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379-80, 1397 (1996). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 1370-71. 
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can evade territorial-based rules by moving to more favorably 
regulated areas. 
According to the Johnson–Post model, cyberspace should hence 
be treated as a separate “space” with its own distinct laws.58 Their 
cyberlibertarian model rejected a field of regulation as dense or 
encompassing as that governing “real space” (or “meat space,” a 
quasi-pejorative popular among cyberpunks). They instead preferred 
self-regulation whereby cyberspace participants would develop their 
“own effective legal institutions.”59 This point of view proved 
extraordinarily influential in the U.S., where Congress upended stable 
fields of law to provide broad immunities from taxation and regulation 
for leading Internet-based firms and Internet Service Providers. Some 
effective self-regulatory bodies developed consensus and agreement 
on Internet hardware and software standards, including the World 
Wide Web Consortium, the Internet Engineering Task Force, and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).60 
However, none are capable of addressing the panoply of problems 
recently identified with Internet politics, economics, and culture.61 
If cyberspace truly is a new realm beyond the reach of states, 
Internet users may not be subject to rules from states where they are 
not physically located, even if those states have vital interests in 
prohibiting or regulating the transactions or communications these 
“netizens” engage in—a recipe for wholesale law breaking. The 
Johnson-Post model generally only incorporates the interests of 
Internet users who, it is argued, have distinct needs that cannot be 
effectively addressed by territorial-based sovereigns.62 But such users 
also have effects on those who do wish for territorial sovereign 
protection.63 
The Johnson–Post model selectively depicts one version of the 
Internet (then and today), along with the inherent difficulties in 
regulating this new forum. The model suffers from normative 
                                                   
 58. See id. at 1379. 
 59. Id. at 1387. 
 60. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward 
a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003). 
 61. For an overview of these problems, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE 
BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND 
INFORMATION (2015). 
 62. See id. at 1402 (explaining how certain characteristics of online use 
require different laws than those applicable to physical geographically defined 
boundaries). 
 63. See Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The 
Case of Amazon, L. &  POL. ECON. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/ 
2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-case-of-amazon/ 
[https://perma.cc/UGZ9-W3VU]. 
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problems when it suggests that regulators should, for the most part, 
maintain a hands-off approach to the Internet. As philosophers are 
fond of reminding us, an “is” is not necessarily an “ought.”64 The fact 
that the Internet is difficult to regulate does not mean that governments 
ought not strive to regulate the Internet. For instance, as Goldsmith 
has noted, “the state in which the harms are suffered has a legitimate 
interest in regulating the activity that produces the harms.”65  
That is not to say that statutes and regulations should not evolve 
in order to adapt to cyberspace. Nor is it meant to deny the value of a 
legal academic field that explores the unusual issues that have arisen 
as free expression, jurisdiction, notice, trespass, and other key legal 
concepts are applied to and tested in online disputes. A classic denial 
in that vein came from Judge Frank Easterbrook. Easterbrook viewed 
cyberlaw as an unhelpful disciplinary focus because, he claimed, it led 
to an overly specialized perspective that removes legal conflicts from 
their broader context.66 He analogized cyberlaw to a fanciful “law of 
the horse,” which might have tempted legal scholars to stray from the 
eternal verities of contracts, just war theory, torts, and civil procedure 
when equine-enabled transport and warfare began to change 
societies.67 Such a focus would seem entirely antiquated today, when 
cars, trains, and drones have supplanted stagecoaches and cavalries. 
Under this view, cyberlaw is unhelpful as it fails to illuminate the 
entire law. 
In our view, Easterbrook’s provocative analogy falls apart upon 
close examination. The Internet and associated “cyber” technologies 
are important and becoming more dominant now, while horses are not 
nearly as critical to contemporary economic, political, and cultural 
infrastructure. The same was true when Easterbrook wrote his article. 
Moreover, a “law of the horse” does exist in the U.S., in the form of 
regulations elaborating how the Animal Welfare Act (at the federal 
level) and various state animal protection statutes (at the state level) 
regulate the feeding, breeding, racing, keeping, and euthanasia of 
horses. Libertarians may deplore the administrative state’s 
“interference” with equine affairs, but that is an ideological position 
that reflects a wish for no law of the horse—not its actuality.  
                                                   
 64. See, e.g., Jane Bailey, Of Mediums and Metaphors: How a Layered 
Methodology Might Contribute to a Constitutional Analysis of Internet Content 
Regulation, 30 MAN. L.J. 197, 197 (2004) (arguing that the question as to whether the 
Internet can be regulated should not be conflated with whether it should be regulated). 
 65. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200 
(1998). 
 66. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-08. 
 67. See id. 
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As Lawrence Lessig responded to Easterbrook, cyberlaw 
courses provide valuable insight into the limits of traditional law as a 
regulator of behavior.68 For a student who wanted to practice law in 
horse racing or similar contexts, classes on the “law of the horse” 
would be useful. There are far more positions in cyberlaw, and 
therefore, simply as an instructional element in law schools, we should 
expect “cyberlaw” to persist. Cyberlaw as a focus of research will also 
continue be of use to policymakers. 
Some law and technology perspectives also respond to 
Easterbrook’s critique by illuminating the broader relationship 
between law and all technologies versus focusing on a specific 
technology (such as information technologies related to the Internet).69 
Other perspectives rely on mature theories of technology outside of 
law to assist with legal analysis. 
Internet exceptionalists like Post and Johnson and Internet legal 
deflaters like Easterbrook may seem to have little in common. 
However, a common sensibility has animated both strains of work. 
Each school has tended toward an instrumentalist point of view, 
characterizing the Internet as one more way of accomplishing set 
human ends. To resist calls for regulation, Johnson and Post had to 
make a jurisdictional, not an essentialist, claim about Internet 
activity.70 They ideologically “located” it outside extant sovereigns’ 
reach.71 This is a point of view now shared by blockchain enthusiasts 
who insist on calling that technology “immutable” and 
“unstoppable.”72 Easterbrook’s error was more obvious. He simply 
assumed that the Internet would enable one more way of commenting, 
transacting, gambling, the way a horse enabled better transport than 
                                                   
 68. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999). 
 69. See Cockfield, supra note 21, at 387-88; see also infra Part IV. 
 70. See Johnson & Post, supra note 55, at 1369-70. 
 71. This was a problematic approach insofar as it downplayed the materiality 
of Internet infrastructure, which is vulnerable to state interference, and in many cases 
ought to be. Moreover, as Julie Cohen diagnosed, “[t]he cyberspace metaphor does 
not refer to abstract, Cartesian space, but instead expresses an experienced spatiality 
mediated by embodied human cognition. Cyberspace in this sense is relative, mutable, 
and constituted via the interactions among practice, conceptualization, and 
representation.” Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 
210 (2007). 
 72. See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market 
Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 837, 861 (2015) (critiquing ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING 
BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2014) and Campbell R. Harvey, 
Bitcoin Myths and Facts 5 (Aug. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479670 
[https://perma.cc/X9LA-9ETF]). 
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walking. He did not appreciate the ways in which such activities could 
be fundamentally changed by their digitization in contexts of rapid 
communication and information sharing. 
B. Code is/as/and Law 
Lawrence Lessig’s groundbreaking book Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace offered a nuanced “middle way” between the “nothing 
new” approach of Easterbrook to cyberlaw and the “totally new” 
approach taken by the cyberlibertarians.73 Observing that software 
physically preventing copying of a DVD may be just as effective as 
prohibitions under copyright law, Lessig maintained that code could 
act as a law of its own but also could be shaped by law. Lessig also 
observed the ways in which technology and law could reinforce one 
another. For example, if governments are worried that consumers will 
access pornography in public libraries, they could pass a law to 
mandate the installation of filtering software on library computers, 
which would inhibit access. 
Lessig’s views represent a clear articulation of an instrumentalist 
approach to law and technology (as well as norms). Lessig’s work 
embodies instrumentalism because the pragmatic analogy between 
code and law also embraces an even broader set of modalities of 
control, including social norms and markets, in Lessig’s terms. By 
presenting very broad categories of human interaction as 
pragmatically analogous methods of generating certain results, Lessig 
helped set discourse on law and technology in the direction of social 
engineering.74  
This, again, is a legacy of Chicago: Just as his one-time Chicago 
colleague Cass Sunstein pressed the ultra-utilitarian ideal of a “cost-
benefit state,” Lessig’s modalities could be seen as varied tools to 
maximize social welfare. And just as Sunstein’s and Lessig’s Chicago 
forebears had advanced economics as a higher authority than law, set 
to displace the common law and statutes where they proved 
“inefficient,” Lessig characterized social norms, markets, and 
technology as all in some way the co-equal of law—its potential 
replacement, rather than phenomena ideally subject to its shaping 
                                                   
 73. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER 
SPACE (2000). 
 74. This path was later more fully realized in DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS 
ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS DO (2013). 
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power.75 Lessig has long since left Chicago for Harvard, in part to 
pursue research on corruption.76  
The “code is law” perspective recognizes that government 
technical interventions may lead to socially ambivalent results—
requiring further intervention.77 As noted, governments are embracing 
or developing powerful surveillance technologies to promote national 
security interests. But this approach raises the risk that abusive state 
practices could take place, inhibiting important democratic values. 
Governments could counter-balance this risk by mandating the use of 
other technologies.78 With respect to concerns surrounding state 
surveillance, governments could, for example, pass legislation that 
would: (1) create digital trails that track how state agents use 
technologies to collect and store personal information; (2) mandate the 
“scrubbing” of personally identifying information from large 
databases; and (3) provide for “low tech” solutions such as publishing 
lists of public spaces that are subject to police surveillance.79  
This cyborg-ish mix of law and technology may seem to 
vindicate the instrumentalist understanding of their 
interchangeability.80 However, substantivists would be quick to 
emphasize that technological and legal developments can change 
(rather than simply better or worse serve) the social goals of mass 
surveillance and shape individuals’ expectations of privacy and free 
expression.81 Scholars are obliged to study past patterns of such effects 
if they are to fairly advise on the true impact of changing balances of 
law, technology, markets, and norms in various fields. 
                                                   
 75. Note that James Buchanan took the Chicago approach one step further, 
developing an economics that commended the uprooting of even constitutional law 
when it stood in the way of a certain vision of economic order. See NANCY MCLEAN, 
DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN 
FOR AMERICA 155 (2017). 
 76. See generally Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand 
“Corruption” to Mean, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 77. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Who Watches the Watchers? A Law and 
Technology Perspective on Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 364, 400 (2003). 
 78. See id. at 400-02. 
 79. For a survey of technological approaches to “watch the watchers,” see 
generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011). 
 80. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 693 (2013). 
 81. See infra Subsection III.A.2.  
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C. The Problematic Results of Cyberlaw Instrumentalism 
Even the earliest technological developments—fire, aqueducts, 
roads—have impacted human lives, customs, and laws. Technology 
can have a gradual impact on human lives, such as improvements in 
home insulation over the past few centuries. Alternatively, it can 
provide a jolt that paves the way for entire new eras of human 
development, from the widespread uses of axes and mortar for stone 
building to indoor plumbing, the steam engine, electricity, 
automobiles, and the Internet. The latter developments raise the 
question whether technology developments follow a continuous 
pattern or whether they usher in entirely new technological eras. To 
promote optimal policy outcomes, cyberlaw discussions asked 
whether “traditional” laws would suffice or whether entirely new 
approaches are needed. Similarly, observers began to examine in a 
more critical fashion how the direct regulation of software and 
hardware technologies could promote optimal legal solutions.  
The code-is-law school of thought has recognized that 
technology imposes constraints on the behavior of individuals and 
businesses. Thus, there is no simple libertarian calculus to equate 
deregulation of technology with an increase in freedom. In a world 
increasingly mediated by complex technologies, broader areas of 
technology could be subject to legal regulation as an effective 
mechanism to protect interests and to enhance the liberty of those 
constrained by current controllers of technology.82  
Unfortunately, this lesson of code is law was not the main 
takeaway of the debates arising out of Lessig’s and related works. 
Those emphasizing cyberspace as a new place, ideally transcending or 
existing outside past forms of regulation, advanced a set of normative 
commitments that tended to counterbalance the insights arising out of 
code-is-law theory. Such intuitions supported sweepingly 
deregulatory interventions—such as the United States’ 
                                                   
 82. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF 
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952) (calling for “public control of private governing 
power”); see also Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its 
Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF 
HETERODOX POLITICAL ECONOMY 184 (1992) (quoting Robert L. Hale, Hale Papers 
32 (unpublished works) (Folder 93-1) (“There is government whenever one person or 
group can tell others what they must do and when those others have to obey or suffer 
a penalty.”)); Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression 
in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 487 (2016) 
(“[P]rivacy, competition, and consumer protection laws. . . . enable a more vibrant 
public sphere. . . . [by] defus[ing] the twin specters of monopolization and total 
surveillance, which are grave threats to freedom of expression.”).  
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Communications Decency Act § 230, which insulated online 
intermediaries from many forms of liability stemming from published 
works.83 The code-is-law approach tended to legitimate such 
interventions, by implying that so many things could take the place of 
law (such as market forces, social norms, or software) that law itself 
was not that important to the development of the Internet.  
For example, if you don’t like the way in which Facebook, 
Google, or Twitter handles right-wing extremism or defamation, call 
them out on social media to evoke social norms. Or boycott them to 
hit their profits. Or unleash automated bots that can evade their 
manipulation detectors to shape the platforms in ways you would like. 
At various points, libertarian thinkers and think tanks have advanced 
each of these strategies as ways of promoting spontaneous order in 
cyber-realms. But such approaches have repeatedly failed to bring 
about the type of emancipatory and egalitarian online experience 
promised by the Internet’s earliest boosters. The main problem, as the 
next section shows, is that legal scholars on both sides of the code-as-
law and cyberspace-as-place debates tended to adopt a narrowly 
instrumentalist understanding of technology. A more substantivist 
approach is needed. 
III. SUBSTANTIVISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INSTRUMENTALISM 
Instrumental perspectives generally view technology as a neutral 
tool. Like economists viewing purchasing behavior as a “revealed 
preference” for certain states of affairs,84 instrumentalists tend to bless 
(or at least accept) technological adoption patterns as the result of 
uncoerced, individual choice. The structural background, which made 
some choices prominent and others occluded, some cheap and easy, 
and others expensive and hard, remains in the background. 
Despite its blindspots, given the influence of methodological 
individualism in the contemporary Anglosphere legal academy, 
instrumentalism may seem like the best way to develop a social theory 
of law and technology. However, there is an alternative. Substantivist 
theories analyze how technology can transform human experience, 
identity, and aims.85 Substantivists particularly worry about how 
                                                   
 83. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 84. See Marcel K. Richter, Revealed Preference Theory, 34 ECONOMETRICA 
635 (1966). 
 85. See generally Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 607 (2007) (discussing the technological transformation of 
aims). 
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technological “structure” can subvert interests that have been 
traditionally protected by law. 
We acknowledge up front there are now thousands of law and 
technology works, and any effort to boil these down to common 
themes is invariably reductionist. However, synthesis should prove 
particularly useful in the field of law and technology to show areas of 
commonality within over-arching analytical approaches. 
A. Theoretical Perspectives 
Many disciplines have developed mature theories of 
technology.86 Social theories of technology are fruitfully divided into 
two groups: those that rely on so-called instrumental theories or 
perspectives on technology and those that follow substantive theories 
about technology.87 In outlining these theories, we are laying the 
foundation for an academic contribution inspired by John Maynard 
Keynes’s observation that “[p]ractical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence[] are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back.”88 In other words, such an examination 
allows us to surface the deep ideological structure of argument in areas 
as seemingly au courant and technocratic as cryptocurrency 
regulation.89  
                                                   
 86. This approach is used by many non-legal academic disciplines. See, e.g., 
NASSER BEHNEGAR, LEO STRAUSS, MAX WEBER, AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF 
POLITICS (2003) (discussing different scientific approaches to the study of political 
science); PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION (2002) 
(providing an economist’s perspective on theories of technology); LANGDON WINNER, 
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (1977) (analyzing the politics of technology and criticizing the uncritical 
acceptance of new technologies); Hughes, supra note 29 (setting out historians’ views 
on technology theories). At times, academic disciplines have developed more focused 
theories involving certain technologies, which co-exist with broader theories of 
technology. For example, a sociologist might explore the impact of information 
technologies on workplace environments within broader attempts to examine 
technological interactions with social structures. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF 
TECHNOLOGY (Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wajcman eds., 2d ed. 1999).  
 87. See, e.g., FEENBERG, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
 88. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY 383 (1936). 
 89. Clifford Geertz’s work in “ideology as a cultural system” is our guide 
here, as is the work of “interpretive social science” in general. See, e.g., Charles 
Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A 
READER 25 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979); Paul Ricoeur, The 
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Generally speaking, instrumental theorists are less interested in 
the broader social, cultural, and political impacts of technology than 
they are in its role as a tool helping individuals pursue their own ends.90 
The instrumentalists are often identified with strains of thought that 
prioritize individual autonomy or agency in matters of technology, 
thanks primarily to an emphasis on human willpower to decide 
whether to adopt technologies. Many of these conceptions of tech-
nology rest on the optimistic premise that technology change produces 
largely beneficent results for individuals and their communities, since 
technology adoption reveals a preference for it rather than coercion 
into using it.91 
In contrast, substantive theories of technology emphasise the 
ways in which technological systems (or “structure”) can have a sub-
stantive impact on individual and community interests that may differ 
from the technologies’ intended impact. Technology may change 
values and goals, not merely help individuals achieve them.92 Sub-
stantive theorists sometimes emphasise how technological structure 
can overcome human willpower or even institutional action. By 
“structure,” it is not meant that machines control us, but rather that 
technological developments can subtly (or unsubtly) undermine 
important interests that the law has traditionally protected. 
Both instrumental and substantive perspectives on technology 
can inform theories of the relationship between law and technology. 
There can be very fruitful conversations within each school. However, 
debates among adherents to different schools are likely to founder 
because they share so few grounding commitments. As Gadamer 
observed, there is a need for some shared horizons to engage in 
meaningful conversation.93 
                                                   
Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL 
SCIENCE: A READER, supra, at 73. 
 90. This Part draws from an earlier work. See generally Arthur J. Cockfield 
& Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 475 (2007). 
 91. For an example of coercion to use technology, see generally Jennifer A. 
Chandler, “Obligatory Technologies”: Explaining Why People Feel Compelled to 
Use Certain Technologies, 32 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 255 (2012) (explaining the 
requirements to undergo back surgery or use genetically modified crops); Frank 
Pasquale, Cognition-Enhancing Drugs: Can We Say No?, 30 BULL. SCI. TECH. & 
SOC’Y 9 (2010). 
 92. See generally Pasquale, supra note 85. 
 93. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). 
“[I]nterpretation is the common ground of interaction between text and interpreter, by 
which each establishes its being . . . interpreter and text are indissolubly linked as a 
matter of being.” For applications of Gadamer to legal interpretation, see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 617-18 
(1990). 
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1. Instrumental Perspectives on Technology as a Neutral Tool 
The instrumentalist perspective tends to articulate optimistic 
conceptions of a society that has taken full advantage of the 
technological tools at its disposal. A number of theorists, particularly 
those in management studies and economics, hold that technology is 
simply a tool—an instrument of the social, political, or economic 
group, or of the individual that chooses to develop and use a certain 
technology.94 Entrenched in boardrooms, the technology trade press, 
and industry-funded think tanks, this instrumental perspective is the 
most widely accepted view of technology.95 “It is [rooted] in many 
social sciences and bureaucratic organizations, from business to 
government to non-profit organizations, and pervades everyday 
[discussions] regarding technology in the larger society.”96 This 
perspective on technology holds that technology is neutral, solely 
serving the intended purposes held for it by its users.97  
The phrase “guns don’t kill people, people kill people” reflects 
the instrumentalist mindset.98 When there is a mass shooting in the 
U.S., gun rights advocates blame individuals—or their mental health 
issues—for the massacre. Similarly, those who wish to immunize 
peer-to-peer file sharing networks call the “dual use” of the technology 
a hallmark of its neutrality.99 Promoters of net neutrality advance a 
normative vision of the “pipes” of the Internet eschewing any 
favoritism as to which content they prioritize, delay, or degrade. 
Neutrality is not merely a descriptive term, but in some technological 
settings a liberal virtue, as it is at bottom procedural, appealing to our 
sense of fairness in process, rather than any more substantive notion 
of optimal results. 
For instrumentalists, the use of certain forms of technology may 
preclude the use of other technologies, but these trade-offs are 
calculable choices rationally arrived at through different forms of 
debate.100 If technology itself affects these debates, it is once again 
                                                   
 94. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: 
WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997) (leading the 
“disruptionist” school in business studies). 
 95. See generally Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 90 (discussing 
instrumental and substantive perspectives and theories of technology). 
 96. Id. at 480. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See generally JOHN R. LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998). 
 99. Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the 
DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 673 (2003).  
 100. See, e.g., WILLIAM GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 252 (1995). Authors who 
espouse this perspective, albeit rarely explicitly, clearly prefer public and democratic 
debate. 
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characterized as neutral. Indeed, a good deal of Internet triumphalism 
characterized the medium as the most neutral public sphere of all, 
enabling anyone to grab a digital soapbox and popularize their ideas.101 
This understanding of technology strongly emphasizes human 
agency and downplays the potential limitations of technological 
systems (i.e., structures). For the instrumentalists, human beings can 
and do direct the use of technology, and the fears of technological 
tyranny overcoming human autonomy are unfounded. Some 
instrumental approaches, such as those found in the management 
sciences, ignore questions of individual autonomy because they are 
exclusively focused on enhancing efficiency, leaving the social 
questions to other disciplines.102 
This instrumental view can be seen as a backdrop to many of the 
perspectives that articulate the arrival of a new information society. 
One of most well-known of these perspectives is Alvin Toffler’s The 
Third Wave, in which he articulates three “waves” of technological 
innovation: agricultural, industrial, and informational.103 The last of 
these, in whose throes we presumably remain today, has transformed 
our world into one oriented toward and almost completely dependent 
upon computer communication technologies.  
Instrumentalist perspectives are often optimistic about 
technology. When the “extensions of man” are characterized as ways 
of realizing (rather than thwarting or changing) persons’ aims, it is 
hard not to get excited about their dissemination and wary of their 
regulation or limitation.104 Sociological theorists like Manuel Castells 
share this optimism to differing extents, but his is a cautious optimism. 
The social theories concerned with technology tend to be a bit more 
pessimistic about potentials for technology. The predominance of 
technological structure as a continuation of previous modes of social 
and political practice that overwhelms individual will in a 
dehumanizing way is also apparent in the works of sociologists of 
technology. 
2. Substantive Theories of Technology 
At this point, it may be helpful to offer examples of how 
technologies can have a political, social, cultural, or other substantive 
                                                   
 101. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 102. See, e.g., Rias J. van Wyk, supra note 7, at 19-31. 
 103. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 26 (1980).  
 104. See ITHIEL DE LA SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 226-27 (1983); 
see also ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 2-6 (2014). 
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impact on society so that they are not merely neutral tools. We offer 
examples of substantive theories of technology, to counterbalance the 
tilt of Part II’s cyberlaw discussion toward instrumentalist 
approaches.105  
Numerous ways exist for engaging in a sociological analysis of 
technology. Some of these are rooted in the earliest traditions of 
sociological analysis, such as those associated with Karl Marx, Max 
Weber, Emile Durkheim, and George Simmel. Others have begun to 
reorient the field of study beyond these modes of inquiry and toward 
approaches less reliant upon their sociological forbearers.106 The 
examination of the relationship between law and technology at times 
draws from critical theories that purport to clear away the fog that 
occurs when traditional legal analysis fails to illuminate the important 
interests at stake. For instance, Froomkin has discussed how critical 
theories help “people understand their true interests and by helping 
them escape from ideological coercion.”107  
The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research founded in 1923 in 
Frankfurt, Germany was a potent source of critical theory. Two of its 
members, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, offer provocative 
critiques of culture in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment.108 
Throughout this text, Horkheimer and Adorno argued that the 
Enlightenment, rather than liberating people from fear, has produced 
new forms of authority and control.109  
The underlying emphasis in this text is that technologies, and in 
particular new media technologies, are designed not to encourage 
human liberation and freedom but rather to set limiting parameters in 
                                                   
 105. See supra Part II. For a discussion concerning how technologies can have 
a substantive impact (e.g., highway overpass bridges deliberately built low to prevent 
low-income transportation, like buses, from travelling out of New York City toward 
the homes of the wealthy on Long Island), see Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have 
Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123-24 (1980). 
 106. The following review does not purport to offer a comprehensive 
examination: for instance, we do not review sociological approaches that rely on 
Social Systems theory or that of Critical Realism. 
 107. Froomkin, supra note 60, at 760-64. For a review of different theories of 
technology, including those that depart from the instrumental theory, see Samuel 
Trosow, The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge: Using Social 
Theory of the Information Age as a Tool for Policy Analysis, 30 MAN. L.J. 417, 419-
20 (2004) (arguing against the instrumental theory of technology); see also James 
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 
U. PA. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1985) (describing the development of legal theories that 
share assumptions concerning the use of social power in apparently rational 
discourse). 
 108. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., 2d ed. 1995). 
 109. See id. at 3. 
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which human beings can express themselves. The “freedom to choose 
an ideology . . . everywhere proves to be freedom to [choose what is 
always] the same,”110 and technology is simply another means by 
which to perpetuate capitalist forms of oppression and domination. 
Fellow Frankfurt School critical theorist Herbert Marcuse is 
even more explicit about the role of technology in his work One 
Dimensional Man.111 In the text, Marcuse holds as a thesis the notion 
that society has been collapsed into one dimension of thought or 
action—a technical and rational dimension.112  
One of the more recent critical texts is Andrew Feenberg’s 
Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited.113 Unlike 
Frankfurt School theorists like Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, 
who explicitly and implicitly posit the predominance of structural 
control, Feenberg attempts to reinstate a notion of human agency and 
engage in “politics of technological transformation.”114 Feenberg 
believes that critical theorists’ despair about inevitable technological 
domination in the 1970s was a wrong turn and that critical theory 
needs to engage in a more interventionist strategy.115 
Feenberg continued this approach in 2017’s Technosystem, 
which takes issue with Christian Fuchs and Jodi Dean for, inter alia, 
essentializing current patterns of power on the Internet (particularly 
those that centralized in major Internet platforms and Internet Service 
Providers) as inevitable concomitants of the technology.116 Feenberg 
usefully distinguishes between critiques of technology itself, as 
opposed to present configurations of technology. However, he might 
have chosen better targets. Dean is quite explicit in her work Blog 
Theory that “communicative capitalism,” as opposed to social 
networking itself, is at least in part responsible for what she 
characterizes as the depoliticizing and narcotizing aspects of online 
experiences. Both Dean and Fuchs promote a more public-spirited 
Internet eventually coming to replace corporate-dominated systems.117  
                                                   
 110. Id. at 135-36. 
 111. See generally HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN 
THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964). 
 112. See id. at xxvi (explaining the one-dimensional man). 
 113. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL 
THEORY REVISITED (2002). 
 114. Id. at 13. 
 115. See id. at 18. 
 116. See ANDREW FEENBERG, TECHNOSYSTEM: THE SOCIAL LIFE OF REASON 
89-99 (2017). 
 117. See generally JODI DEAN, BLOG THEORY: FEEDBACK AND CAPTURE IN THE 
CIRCUITS OF DRIVE (2010); CHRISTIAN FUCHS, INTERNET AND SOCIETY: SOCIAL 
THEORY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2007). 
 Beyond Instrumentalism 849 
3. Weber’s “Iron Cage” and Ellul’s “Technique” 
The views of two late law professors, Max Weber and Jacques 
Ellul, have proven to be particularly influential. Their writings share 
some of the common elements of substantive theories of technology 
from which our substantivist perspective on law and technology is 
drawn. 
In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,118 Max 
Weber suggests that Puritan ethics and ideas influenced the 
development of capitalism.119 Weber describes capitalism as creating 
an organizational shift towards rationalization and bureaucratization 
from a value-oriented organization to a goal-oriented organization. As 
a result, the increased rationalization of human life traps individuals 
in an “iron cage” of rule-based, rational control: The new economic 
order “is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of 
machine production which to-day determine the lives of all individuals 
who are born into this mechanism . . . with irresistible force.”120  
Though Weber’s notion of the iron cage—the restrictive 
rationalization of human life that society has created for itself—has 
filtered throughout many contemporary texts, it is perhaps best 
rearticulated in light of the theoretical position of Jacques Ellul. Ellul 
suggests in his widely cited text, The Technological Society, that 
current society and society’s future will be one in which people 
become increasingly dependent on machines.121 This is a society in 
which people order their lives to accommodate the demand of 
rationality and efficiency, the mode of operation upon which machines 
exist.122 
In his numerous texts, Ellul questions whether such a society has 
indeed progressed. He contends it has not, and that the advent of the 
technological environment has seriously impinged upon human 
                                                   
 118. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).  
 119. See id.  
 120. Id. at 123. Weber rejects the metaphor of capitalism as a “light cloak” 
that can be thrown aside in favor of the metaphor of an “iron cage.” Id. For an effort 
to link Weber’s views more directly with technology concerns, see Terry Maley, Max 
Weber and the Iron Cage of Technology, 24 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 69 (2004) 
(claiming that Weber should be reassessed as a compelling critic of science and 
technology). Importantly, Maley suggests that there is a potential for human agency 
found within Weber’s work and that one need not take the same direction as Ellul. See 
id. at 74. Rather Weber “does not foreclose the possibility of meaningful intervention” 
in his postulation of the iron cage. Id. at 84.  
 121. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 305 (John Wilkinson 
trans., 1964). 
 122. See id. at 74. 
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freedom and autonomy.123 In his writing, the social, political, and 
economic worlds are seen in terms of epochal transitions, and Ellul 
was concerned about what he saw as a particularly dire transition to 
an oppressive epoch—that of the technological society.124  
In this technological society, all of life is being subsumed by 
“technique” described as “the totality of methods rationally arrived at 
and having absolute efficiency . . . in every field of human activity.”125 
In this environment, everything is measured against its rationality and 
efficiency.  
4. Technological Determinism and Recent Efforts  
One of the underlying concerns in most substantive theories of 
technology is the notion of technological determinism.126 These 
theories frame technology, to greater or lesser extents, as inherently 
possessing a structure that in turn produces a society that must act and 
exist in certain ways.127 Modern technologies, as suggested by Ellul 
and others, are the real culprits in enhancing this determinism.128  
Critics assert that some of the above-noted substantive 
approaches can be too deterministic, because they attribute too many 
of society’s current features to the technology it adopts. More recent 
works have tried to address the issue of technological determinism by 
trying to assess its complexities in a more comprehensive manner. For 
Manuel Castells, the transformation towards information capitalism is 
one in which the social, economic, and political worlds have become 
centralized around networks that link people, institutions, and 
countries.129 This is “the network society” we now dwell within, and it 
is largely a result of the development of information and 
communication technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones 
that enable communication and the transmission of information and 
                                                   
 123. See id. at 138. 
 124. See JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 89, 135 (Geoffrey W. Bromily 
trans., 1989). 
 125. ELLUL, supra note 121, at xxv. 
 126. See id. at xvii. 
 127. See id. at 138, 406. 
 128. See generally id. Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, provides another well-known view that technology is 
interwoven in complex ways with individual identities so that it can structure or frame 
individual choices. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS (William Lovitt trans., 1977). 
 129. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 18-22 
(1996). 
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ideas to occur on an unprecedented global scale.130 By shifting the 
focus in social analysis towards that of a network, Castells has 
articulated a new way of understanding the connection between 
humanity and technology.131 Castells’ work places people and their 
artifacts in a mutually bound relationship.132 
In addition to focusing on networks as a unit of analysis (like 
Castells does), Science and Technology Studies (STS) aim to 
understand “science and technology as social relations and as socially 
constructed.”133 So while Castells gives us a sense of how important 
networks are to technology and vice versa, STS gives us a sense of the 
complexity of social structures behind the production, distribution, 
and consumption of science and technology. According to STS, we 
can learn more about technology by paying attention to the processes 
by which technologies are made and the myriad ways in which these 
technologies may be put to use, which vary in degree from the 
intentions or original design.134 This suggests that science and 
technology developments are driven by social relationships and 
networks as well as formalized practices and the employment of 
scientific methodology. Principally, STS demonstrates that scientific 
and technological practices are far more socially nuanced and complex 
than dominant public perceptions and presentations of these practices 
suggest.  
As for a theoretical framing of these issues, one theory 
articulated by a number of STS researchers is the Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT).135 ANT posits that the work of “technoscience,” a term 
that indicates the interdependence of science and technology, is about 
                                                   
 130. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 2 (2001). 
 131. See id. at 2-3. 
 132. See id. at 2. 
 133. WENDA K. BAUCHSPIES, JENNIFER CROISSANT, & SAL RESTIVO, SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 (2006). See generally THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, & 
Trevor Pinch eds., 2012). 
 134. By way of example, cellular phones were designed to enable wireless 
communications, but because technologies were needed to calculate the physical 
location of the cell phone to work, they are also now used as a government tracking 
devices to the extent that state agents can access telephone company records that track 
the geographic location of the phone’s usage. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen 
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
754 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“While the cell phone was not originally conceived as a 
tracking device, law enforcement converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell site 
data.”). 
 135. See SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
STUDIES 65 (2d ed. 2004). 
852 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
the creation of larger and stronger networks. For ANT, these networks 
are heterogeneous, including “[b]oth human and non-humans [that] 
have interests that . . . need to be accommodated.”136 Under this view, 
technology and technological processes help construct social 
situations, just as human beings do. 
The relationship between technology and history is likewise 
complex: Technological development and use have many outcomes. 
Technology is not given to one specific future, despite Ellul’s dire 
warnings of a social world in which technique dominates. Nor is 
technology solely a slave to capitalist enterprises as some sociological 
perspectives might suggest. As opposed to a relatively strict 
technological determinism, notions of a “soft determinism” remain 
tenable.137 Thus, technologies may be seen as embedded in a particular 
“technological frame[]” that serves to guide or configure future 
actions and relationships with those technologies, their users, and their 
subjects.138 Overall, STS demonstrates that there is an interrelation 
between historical social development and the development of 
technology. Rather than suggesting that one drives the other (a 
reductionist critique of the perspectives of both instrumentalism and 
technological determinism), STS seeks a middle ground, seeing 
history and technological development as intertwined. 
                                                   
 136. Id. at 81. The goal of these networks is to act together to achieve a 
particular and consistent effect in a machine-like fashion. See id. at 65. The goal may 
likewise be to produce particular facts, in which the network is employed to ensure 
that the components are in agreement. See id. at 82. Empirical research informed by 
ANT tends to focus both on the interests of the actors being examined (human, 
machine, or artifact) and the socially inscribed process of “translating” these interests. 
See id. In both scientific and technological endeavours, ANT highlights the very social 
nature of the work that is involved in the relationships that exist or are made to exist 
between objects and their representations. See id. at 82. 
 137. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Individual Autonomy, Law, and Technology: 
Should Soft Determinism Guide Legal Analysis?, 30 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 4, 6 
(2010). 
 138. See SISMONDO, supra note 135, at 103. Technological frames are built up 
after periods of “[i]nterpretive [f]lexibility,” in which a given technology can be seen 
as having numerous potential trajectories. See id. at 143. STS typically points out that 
in the end the social expectations and the design of a given technology begin to 
coalesce around a singular purpose and expectation. The technological frame and the 
reduction in interpretive flexibility serve to both configure the way a particular 
technology is able to be used as well as configure the user of that technology by setting 
the parameters under which the technology may be socially expected to be used. See 
id. at 87. This view is consistent with views of observers who assert that technology 
developments cannot be separated from social, cultural, economic, and political 
processes. To a certain extent, this view departs from what has been called the 
instrumental theory of technology where technologies should be adopted as long as 
they promote an instrumental purpose that enhances efficiency. See FEENBERG, supra 
note 33, at 5. 
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IV. REVISITING CYBERLAW FROM A SUBSTANTIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
Scholars have recognized the need for a more holistic 
perspective in cyberlaw and broader law and technology analysis.139 In 
Part II, we discussed several shortcomings of dominant, 
instrumentalist perspectives in cyberlaw. A foundational debate for 
the field—whether cyberlaw was an entirely new area, or merely a 
“[l]aw of the [h]orse” destined to be absorbed into traditional doctrinal 
categories—obscured the narrow methodological foundations of the 
origins of the field.140 Commentators modeled quintessentially legal 
dilemmas as essentially engineering problems—to be solved via 
principles of maximization of some agreed upon end, be it efficiency, 
innovation, or progress.141 The common reception of Lawrence 
Lessig’s “modalities” approach further muddied the waters by 
modeling computer code as a functional equivalent to law, markets, 
architecture, or norms.142 
Social theory, science and technology studies, and sociological 
approaches to technology have become increasingly influential in 
cyberlaw scholarship.143 These approaches have complemented the 
economics- and engineering-inspired views of what might be termed 
“Cyberlaw 1.0.” While it is impossible to survey this entire field, 
beginning with Section IV.A, we show in this penultimate section the 
ways in which these substantivist approaches, which recognize the 
                                                   
 139. See generally Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 607 (2007); Cockfield, supra note 21.  
 140. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 66.  
 141. See generally DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT 
WHAT LAWYERS DO (2013). This approach is troubling because there are so many 
ways in which problem definition—a given for engineers—is contested in so many 
legal and political contexts. Moreover, the field of engineering lacks many of the 
safeguards necessary for such modeling. See, e.g., David A. Banks, Engineered for 
Dystopia, BAFFLER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://thebaffler.com/latest/engineered-for-
dystopia-banks [https://perma.cc/Y8BW-NVFF] (“Unlike medical professionals who 
have a Hippocratic oath and a licensure process, or lawyers who have bar associations 
watching over them, engineers have little ethics oversight outside of the institutions 
that write their paychecks. That is why engineers excel at outsourcing blame: to 
clients, to managers, or to their fuzzy ideas about the problems of human nature.”). 
See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA & STEFFEN HERTOG, ENGINEERS OF JIHAD (2016) 
(describing the propensity of engineers to join fundamentalist and extremist 
organizations).  
 142. See generally Lessig, supra note 68. 
 143. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to 
Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 505, 517 (2005); Kieran Tranter, ‘The History of the Haste Wagons’: The 
Motor Car Act 1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 843, 875-79 (2005) (attempting to identify common links among legal 
responses to innovations). 
854 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
non-linear and complex inter-relationship between technology and 
individuals as well as their communities, help balance the cyberlaw 
conversation. In Section IV.B, we set out how the conceptual model 
of the “digital persona” acknowledges a broader role for 
constitutional, human rights and other laws in holistically protecting 
digital personhoods. Section IV.C explores a case study in Internet 
law—regarding the regulation of robotic “expression” online—to 
show the importance of balancing instrumentalist approaches to law 
and technology analysis with more substantive ones. 
A. The Instrumentalist–Substantivist Divide 
To fully understand the differences between an instrumentalist 
and a substantivist approach to law and technology, a chart of contrasts 
is helpful. The chart below summarizes some instructive, ideal-typical 
contrasts that will be elucidated in the rest of this section:  
 
 Instrumentalist Substantivist 
Ontology Atomist/individualist Holist 
Social 
Scientific 
Affinity 
Functionalism Conflict Theory 
View of State 
Intervention 
Hermeneutics of 
suspicion 
Hermeneutics of 
charity 
Economic 
Orientation 
Capitalist/market Social democracy 
Eschatological 
Dimensions 
Singularity Peaceable kingdom 
of present species 
 
While these contrasts by no means exhaust the potential 
differences between instrumentalist and substantivist approaches, they 
do serve as an instructive encapsulation of the ways in which 
foundational assumptions, orientations, and goals can inform research 
in the field. 
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1. Rival Ontologies in Cyberlaw 
The question of ontology is ultimately one of the “really real,” 
the ground of being.144 In instrumentalist cyberlaw scholarship, 
technology itself is all too often taken as a foundational reality, which 
must be accommodated. From a more substantivist approach, law and 
policy can shape technology so that it better accommodates human 
ends. For example, the dominant approaches to high-frequency 
trading in stock markets have tended to assume that networks will 
continue to speed the pace of trading—or, at the very least, that the 
current pace of algorithmic finance will be maintained.145 However, it 
is also possible to place law, policy, or government at the center of the 
picture, as the cause of acceleration, rather than simply the site of a 
belated response to it.146 
2. Social Science in Cyberlaw 
As noted earlier, the economistic foundations of Cyberlaw 1.0 
deeply influenced the nature of work in that vein. But there was an 
even deeper social scientific orientation in this work: Mainstream 
economics is a largely functionalist affair.147 Under functionalist social 
science approaches, the challenge for researchers is to assemble 
models of equilibrium and exchange that rationalize the existence and 
interrelationships of the main actors in a scenario. Rooted in organic 
metaphors (of, say, the society as a body, with each part performing a 
particular function, both supported by and supporting the whole), 
these functionalist approaches are biased toward elucidating 
harmonious or mutually supportive exchange. This Whiggish 
sensibility also informed the positive vision of cyberspace, or at least 
the Internet, as a fundamentally egalitarian and democratizing force.148 
For example, in Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks, 
technologies of interconnection were poised to deliver unprecedented 
                                                   
 144. Kit Fine, The Question of Ontology, in METAMETAPHYSICS: NEW ESSAYS 
ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ONTOLOGY (David Chalmers, et al., eds., 2009) 171 (framing 
the goal of ontology as “clarification of the concept of what is real”). 
 145. See generally Megan Woodward, The Need for Speed: Regulatory 
Approaches to High Frequency Trading in the United States and the European Union, 
50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1359 (2017). 
 146. See generally Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: 
Redefining the Problem of High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085 
(2015). 
 147. Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 
ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 269, 309 (2010). 
 148. See generally id. (explaining this biased view of the Internet). 
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access to movies, music, and all manner of intellectual endeavor, to 
individual users, disrupting content controlling oligopolies.149 
Another approach toward social science is more conflict 
oriented. The fundamental story here is not one of harmonious 
interaction but of struggle to control resources and recognition.150 
“Conflict theory” is a capacious, if awkward, category for such work. 
In cyberlaw, conflict-oriented approaches have focused on the role of 
large technology firms in dispossessing creators of intellectual 
property of potential royalties.151 Such firms are also in conflict with 
their own workers, given antitrust complaints against them as 
monopsonistic price fixers of certain forms of labor via anti-poaching 
agreements.152 These kinds of conflicts have become more pronounced 
in recent years, particularly given the weaponization of social media 
and search in various cultural and political struggles.153 The most 
prominent current example in U.S. circles is the Russian government’s 
sponsorship of hackers to feed disinformation into social media to 
influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. 
                                                   
 149. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 68 (2006) (explaining peer 
production of information). 
 150. See generally Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? 
Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. (1995), 
https://newleftreview.org/I/212/nancy-fraser-from-redistribution-to-recognition-
dilemmas-of-justice-in-a-post-socialist-age [https://perma.cc/3TF6-MBUX] 
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 151. See Peter Jakobsson & Fredrik Stiernstedt, Pirates of Silicon Valley: 
State of Exception and Dispossession in Web 2.0, FIRST MONDAY (2010), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2799 [https://perma.cc/4CDN-
VKBR] (explaining the issues with people’s dispossession of copyright and other 
intellectual property). 
 152. See generally Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 
35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2016) (reporting on Google/Apple “anti-poaching” 
antitrust case). 
 153. See generally SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW 
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); Frank Pasquale, The Automated Public 
Sphere, in THE POLITICS OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? (Ann Rudinow 
Sætnan, Ingrid Schneider, & Nicola Green eds., 2018); Ramona Pringle, In 2017, Tech 
Turned Dark, CBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/tech-2017-negative-effects-fake-news-
1.4463340 [https://perma.cc/8BLE-329K]; Tom Simonite, 2017 Was the Year We Fell 
Out of Love with Algorithms, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/2017-was-the-year-we-fell-out-of-love-with-
algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/3QWT-LN3T]. 
 Beyond Instrumentalism 857 
3. Rival Views of State Intervention in Cyberlaw 
For dominant cyberlaw frameworks, law should only indirectly 
influence technological innovations by providing a legal framework 
for these developments to take place. Capitalist democracies accept 
that law enables private property regimes under the values of 
liberalism or in an attempt to promote wealth creation by protecting 
the interests of innovators.154 Markets in turn are to determine whether 
technologies persist or become obsolete. This approach supports 
hermeneutics of suspicion in analyzing state intervention in digital 
technologies or digital markets. For example, widespread support of 
CDA § 230 immunities in the U.S., which insulate online 
intermediaries from legal liability in certain circumstances, reflects 
this kind of suspicion.155 
By contrast, a more substantivist approach is more open to state 
intervention. The right to be forgotten offers a good example of the 
types of divergent approaches that can occur here.156 U.S. 
commentators have tended to be very critical, assuming that the types 
of negative liberty protected by the First Amendment exhaust the 
capacities and potential of free expression law. European 
policymakers have struck a more nuanced balance between speech 
rights and privacy rights in the area of purposeful obscurity of certain 
database entries.157  
4. Economic Orientation: Capitalism Versus Social Democracy 
For the substantivist, the market, like technology, is always 
embedded in a social context and dependent on certain laws, which 
are themselves reciprocally embedded in a particular economic and 
technological context.158 Forms of market exchange like capitalism are 
                                                   
 154. See generally STONEMAN, supra note 86, at 306 (discussing the 
economics of innovation and technological diffusion and noting the need to link 
policy to theorizing on welfare optimality).  
 155. See generally Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401 (2002) (discussing political pressures that encouraged the 
immunization of intermediary liability). 
 156. See generally Emily Linn, A Look into the Data Privacy Crystal Ball: A 
Survey of Possible Outcomes for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Agreement, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1311 (2017). 
 157. See Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 515, 516 (2015) (stating that reputation justice is served by a system where some 
data subjects can remove, or obscure, certain irrelevant information so as it does not 
dominate the impression of an aggrieved individual). 
 158. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 482 (1985). 
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even more specifically dependent upon certain relations of 
production.159 Instrumentalists are more eager to achieve parsimony in 
their models of society and, therefore, do less to emphasize the 
particularity and context of situations. 
For example, in cases of intermediary responsibility for online 
hate speech or enabling of intellectual property infringement, an 
instrumentalist is much more likely to find a particular and narrow set 
of costs to minimize (such as collateral censorship) and benefits to 
maximize (such as social inclusiveness and free expression). The key 
to instrumentalism is defining some small set of desiderata and 
adjusting law and policy to maximize them.160 A more substantivist 
approach considers more closely the ways in which the Internet 
changes the nature of hate speech and intellectual property 
infringement.161 It sees the question of legal regulation as less of a 
binary (whether to extend or not extent extant patterns of law) and 
more of a context-dependent inquiry that may create the need for 
whole new kinds of approaches. 
5. Eschatological Dimensions: Singularity Versus Peaceable 
Kingdom 
Though instrumentalists tend to characterize their approach as 
pragmatic, core belief systems ultimately must take a position on 
futures near and far. Instrumentalism is, at its core, a wildly open-
ended approach to human relations.162 Once goals are specified, a very 
wide array of means of reaching them is permitted. So, for instance, if 
the goal is to increase test scores of students, any instructional set up—
from traditional classroom to iPad-prodded video lectures and 
games—is appropriate to the extent it raises the scores. If the goal is 
                                                   
 159. See RICHARD MARSDEN, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL: MARX AFTER 
FOUCAULT 112 (1999). 
 160. See generally F. Gregory Hayden, Instrumentalist Policymaking: Policy 
Criteria in a Transactional Context, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 361 (1995). 
 161. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 
(2014) (engaging in an in-depth analysis of the nature of harassment online to ground 
a set of nuanced policy proposals). Lawyer–sociologists like Ifeoma Ajunwa and Ari 
Ezra Waldman are also leading this movement in the privacy area—not simply taking 
old goals of privacy into the digital realm, but exploring the new goals that must be 
part of online privacy policy and law given the ways in which the digital have changed 
information exchange. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 
55 HOUS. L. REV. 659 (2018); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason Schultz, 
Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017). 
 162. See Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth 
Century American Legal Thought, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 863 (1981) (stating that 
instrumentalism, which is “devoid of intrinsic goods,” is open-ended). 
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to induce the mentally ill to increase the number of times they say they 
are feeling “good to well” in surveys, either talk therapy, a pill, or an 
app could be a means of reaching such a goal. From a more 
substantivist perspective, the process of education or mental health 
care is more clearly defined. Computers have a role in both settings, 
but the relationships are fundamentally defined by human-to-human 
interaction—a constitutive practice in these fields.163 
The instrumental viewpoint assumes that there is something 
beyond embodied relationships of human beings that can account for 
the purpose of institutions and relationships that are now almost 
entirely carried out by or enacted by humans. This abstraction feeds 
into the telos of “singularitarianism,” which both predicts and 
encourages the merger of person and machine into cyborg-ish hybrids, 
perhaps eventually evolving into pure machine.164 We are by no means 
asserting that all instrumentalists are singularitarians—rather, we are 
simply noting that the mental framework of instrumentalism is more 
open to such evolution of humans and societies than a more 
substantivist approach. 
Substantivists prioritize instead the maintenance of present 
institutions and relationships and their present organic substrates. The 
idea here is that there is not some completely optimized form of 
humanity or society that Ellulian technique is destined to bring about 
via some Darwinian process. Rather, part of our free will (both 
personally and at a collective level via democratic action) is to 
preserve a peaceable kingdom of more and less technologically 
advanced forms of life.165  
                                                   
 163. Frank Pasquale, Professional Judgment in an Era of Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning, BOUNDARY2 (forthcoming, 2019), at 
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TOMORROW (2017); RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN 
COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1999).  
 165. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 2 (1995) (taking into the realm of varied technology 
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B.  Linking the Substantive Perspective with the Digital Persona 
Model 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a digital persona is a concept 
used to describe how our legal rights, interests and obligations are 
increasingly interwoven with our real life interests. Just as we would 
hope to go about our business in the real world without undue 
harassment, we might expect that our online lives would be similarly 
unconstrained (harkening back to the late John Perry Barlow’s perhaps 
overly utopic vision of cyberspace). This section links the substantive 
perspective on law and technology with the digital persona model and 
overviews a digital bill of rights for a digital persona.166 
A digital persona is, essentially, an avatar of a real person whose 
life is interwoven with the digital world (or “digital biosphere”).167 In 
many ways, the digital persona represents an advance in terms of 
social relationships as it can enable an individual to transcend or 
escape some of the constraints that affect the non-digital lives of 
individuals at a micro-level every day. Freed from these structural 
constraints, the digital persona can roam, explore, and evolve, unless 
the structural constraints of the non-digital impinge upon their digital 
environment. As the digital biosphere evolves, these structural 
constraints have become more prominent and contested. Different 
stakeholders with different goals, including large technology firms, 
government agencies, and even harmful individuals and groups, seek 
to track us as we roam, dictate how we roam and explore, what we see, 
even how we experience the online journey. 
We use the term digital persona to set our model apart from 
narrower views of digital identity (while recognizing similar 
substantive technology perspectives have been advanced under the 
narrower views).168 In privacy law, discussions of personal identity 
often surround notions of control over what third parties can know 
about an individual—hence, law normally seeks to regulate 
information collection practices. At least in this sense, identity is 
narrower than personhood, which is a construct to describe the whole 
self. 
Personhood includes the notion that, ideally, an individual 
should be able to exercise free will and freedom of choice without 
                                                   
 166. See infra Section IV.B (linking the substantive perspective with the 
digital persona model). 
 167. See generally Cockfield, supra note 53.  
 168. Our approach is, however, consistent with the tentative embrace of the 
“cyborg” metaphor in Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control: 
A Social Theory of the Smart City, FIRST MONDAY (2015), 
https://firstmonday.org/article/view/5903/4660 [https://perma.cc/7F5C-V5TJ]. 
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undue manipulation (for instance, freedom from seeing a political 
effort disguised as an online news story). Under the older natural rights 
view, personhood includes the moral entitlement to “one’s one,” 
which necessarily includes freedom of expression, thought, belief, and 
conscience.169 In other words, while the older views protected interests 
such as privacy, the digital persona model strives to proactively 
protect autonomy.170  
Not only does treatment by third parties shape one’s sense of 
self, but this treatment can have discriminatory or otherwise 
exclusionary substantive outcomes and provoke other political (e.g., 
antidemocratic) and social (e.g., being offered market choices based 
on racially biased algorithms) outcomes.  
Consistent with the substantive technology perspectives 
discussed previously, Cathy O’Neil, for instance, argues that 
prediction algorithms are never truly neutral, but rather reflect our 
biases, prejudices and past experience.171 Timothy Wu discusses how 
these algorithms are often designed to maximize online engagement 
time, and track every keystroke to gather personal data that provides 
clues as to our needs and desires—to better manipulate us.172 
Under the substantivist perspective, the meshing of law and 
technology increasingly generates these substantive outcomes. That is, 
this meshing within the virtual world ultimately determines how 
individuals are treated in the real world. Hence, the digital persona 
model is in the end meant to advance individual autonomy by 
signaling the need for greater legal protection, particularly against 
unaccountable and unseen forces that seek to manipulate us. It alerts 
us to the fact that sometimes individual vulnerabilities are amplified 
within the digital biosphere. These individuals can be at risk in ways 
that are not apparent in the real world, including identity theft, illegal 
usage of personal data, blackmail through ransomware, and so on.  
The model opens our eyes to conceiving of the need for a more 
holistic protection of self-directed online explorations. The model also 
helps to focus attention on the fact that a digital persona is largely 
constituted by two external forces: law and technology. Because we 
recognize both law and technology are infused with political, social, 
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and cultural meaning, the framing does not limit discussion or 
downplay the complexity that remains at the intersection of law and 
technology. It simply acknowledges that how we are treated in the 
digital world increasingly has ramifications in the real world.  
The digital persona model also follows ongoing technology 
trends whereby there is an ever-greater mental union between a person 
and his digital analog. Notably, we may be moving closer to Gibson’s 
vision of cyberspace,173 where our perceptions may be dominated by 
digital mediation. We may be getting glimpses of this mental meshing 
as users “jack into” virtual reality platforms wearing haptic suits that 
provide sensory feedback to events occurring within the online world, 
a place where many of us already spend too much time.174 It raises the 
possibility that individuals will increasingly lead critical portions of 
their lives online, raising the risk of greater harm to an individual’s 
autonomy from manipulation or even mere carelessness. The digital 
persona model hence suggests a greater need for constitutional, human 
rights, and other protections for the digital persona—perhaps even 
ultimately a digital bill of rights.  
We note that, under our substantivist perspective, the digital 
persona model avoids Easterbrook’s worry concerning too much focus 
on a particular technology, which he claimed was like studying the 
law of the horse.175 Nor do we wish to affirm the cyberexceptionalism 
view that the digital persona requires entirely new law. Rather, the 
digital persona is a law and technology construct, reflecting an 
extension of an individual’s existing legal interests. Accordingly, 
application of “traditional” law may suffice to protect what are after 
all traditional interests, whereas new forms of law may also be needed 
to counterbalance new threats to dignity and autonomy.  
To achieve those aims, the following paragraphs outline a few 
components of a potential digital bill of rights. 
Personal Data Rights: Users often trade their personal data for 
access to social media with little oversight and accountability 
surrounding the usage and disclosure of this data.176 Large social 
network platforms like Facebook are tied into a web of data brokers 
who use sophisticated algorithms to micro-target these same users.177 
This environment seems to require strengthening privacy laws and 
policies based on fair information collection practice principles such 
as the European Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation 
                                                   
 173. See GIBSON, supra note 47, at 51.  
 174. See supra Section II.A. 
 175. See supra Section II.A. 
 176. See WU, supra note 172, at 323.  
 177. See id. at 299. 
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(GDPR) or Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act. Data privacy rights need to be updated to provide 
users with greater perceived and actual control of their personal 
information. The GDPR for instance makes it clearer that third parties 
cannot access personal data unless a data subject opts in after receiving 
a request written in plain language, not legalese. 
Data Transparency Rights: As a digital persona travels 
throughout the digital biosphere he or she needs full disclosure 
concerning ways that third parties seek to sway his or her views.178 
Online ads should contain a link to information such as who bought 
the ad, whether the ad is connected to a political party, how much was 
spent, and so on. 
Algorithm Transparency Rights: Similarly, a digital persona 
needs assurances his or her paths are not loaded with hidden dangers. 
Governments and businesses are now deploying powerful algorithms, 
often supported by artificial intelligence software such as machine 
learning where only the initial parameters are set. These algorithms 
sift through billions of data points per day to try to discern and 
sometimes shape specific behavioral patterns, raising a host of ethical 
and social issues.179 A system of rules is needed to mandate audits and 
review of these algorithms to guard against downsides.180 
Representative Taxation Rights: The digitization of the global 
economy lets large technology companies off the tax hook, mainly 
because intangible assets like brands, goodwill, patents, and 
copyright, are highly mobile and can be transferred to low- or zero-tax 
jurisdictions.181 Global rules need to be realigned with the challenges 
presented by this new economy to ensure fair taxation in governments 
where, for instance, large consumer markets enjoy taxing profits 
associated with these markets. 
Digital Security Rights: A digital persona needs sufficient legal 
protection against outside hackers and others who are interested in 
illegal or improper access to personal data. 
In summary, a digital bill of rights would recognize that an 
individual’s digital persona is increasingly interwoven with real world 
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consequences and help to promote autonomy and dignity for a user’s 
online experiences. 
C. Cyberlaw Case Study: Free Expression Online in an Age of Bots 
To understand the stakes of the contrast between 
instrumentalism and substantivism, it is helpful to review debates on 
the nature of robotic speech online. For instrumentalists like Eugene 
Volokh, bots are simply a way of extending existing speech rights by 
individuals.182 Reasoning from an example of an animatronic sculpture 
that speaks, Volokh argues that “[t]he government can’t restrict what 
the sculpture is programmed to say . . . because the artist is endowed 
with constitutional rights and the restriction would restrict the artist’s 
right to communicate (and the listeners’ right to hear).”183 So he 
justifies expansive protections for information generated using 
computer algorithms. In an article refining and extending this 
instrumentalist perspective, Stuart Benjamin predicts that courts will 
expand the coverage of First Amendment protection to artificial 
intelligence (AI), including algorithmic data processing.184 
A substantivist approach is more skeptical of such reasoning, 
since a massive change in quantity and speed of expression also marks 
a shift in quality. As Tim Wu has observed, “[c]omputers make 
trillions of invisible decisions each day; the possibility that each 
decision could be protected speech should give us pause.”185 He and 
other scholars have forcefully argued for limiting constitutional 
protection of “machine speech.”186 These calls have renewed urgency 
in 2018, as the weaponization of cyberspace by state and non-state 
actors has become increasingly apparent. California has even required 
bot disclosure to ensure that persons are not deceived by AI online.187 
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Courts are divided on whether algorithmic generation of search 
results and newsfeeds merits full First Amendment protection.188 The 
question of bot-generated speech has not yet received sustained 
judicial attention. However, it will become increasingly important. 
American voters still do not know to what extent foreign governments 
and non-state actors used bots to manipulate social media and search 
engines during the presidential election of 2016.189 These entities are 
exceptionally important gatekeepers.190 The Federal Election 
Commission shirked its duty to require disclosure of the source of 
much political advertising on Facebook and Twitter. Reports now 
suggest that the goal of the Russian buyers of many “ads was to 
amplify political discord in the U.S. and fuel an atmosphere of 
divisiveness and chaos.”191 Social media firms are cooperating with 
investigators now. But they will likely fight proactive regulation by 
arguing that their algorithmic feeds are speech. In fact, they have 
already deleted critical information.192 
Given the growing concern among political scientists about the 
extraordinary power of secret algorithmic manipulation to target 
influential messaging to persons with little to no appreciation of its 
ultimate source, a substantivist approach would warn courts against 
privileging algorithmic data processing as speech. As James 
Grimmelmann has warned with respect to “robotic copyright,” First 
Amendment protection for the products of AI could systematically 
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favor machine over human speech.193 On only the thinnest of 
instrumentalist grounds is there a recognizable continuity between the 
two (as both potentially influencing or manipulating listeners or 
readers). A growing body of empirical research on the troubling 
effects of an “automated public sphere” suggests that bot-mediated 
communication is an entirely distinct phenomenon from previous 
modes of communication.194 For example, massively invasive data 
profiles can make it easy to target communication toward those most 
susceptible to manipulation.195 
Our digital persona model leads to the same conclusion. The 
model focuses on the need to promote autonomy within online 
experiences.196 Computers and networks increasingly shape forms of 
expression related to our digital persona. It is clear that algorithmic 
speech can interfere with autonomy by manipulating or distorting 
choices individuals may make.  
To restore public confidence in democratic deliberation, 
legislators might require rapid disclosure of the data used to generate 
algorithmic speech, the algorithms employed, and the targeting of that 
speech. U.S. legislation akin to the GDPR’s Right to Explanation 
would not infringe on, but would rather support, First Amendment 
values. Affected firms may assert that their algorithms are too 
complex to disclose.197 If so, governments should ban the targeting and 
arrangement of information at issue, because the speech protected in 
the Constitution must bear some recognizable relation to human 
cognition.  
From a substantivist approach, courts should not strike down 
bans on subliminal advertising, or its modern-day equivalents, since 
such “communication” operates outside the sphere of cognition. They 
should similarly avoid intervening to protect “speech” premised on 
elaborate and secretive human subjects research on Internet users. 
Moreover, even if free expression protection extends to algorithmic 
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L. REV. 995 (2014). 
 196. See id. at 999. 
 197. See id. at 1004. On the need to limit the scope and power of such 
“inexplicable” artificial intelligence, see Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of 
Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic 
Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017). 
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targeting, disclosure rules are essential and constitutionally sound.198 
In short, context matters, and a substantivist perspective reveals the 
critical distinctions between different forms of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Many scholarly perspectives promote understanding of how 
technology intersects with public policy and legal matters, but they 
also have blind spots. Traditional research areas that fall within this 
rubric include copyright, trademark, patent, telecommunications, and 
mass media law. More recent research efforts include cyberlaw and 
emerging efforts to more broadly examine the relationship between 
law and technology.199 
These areas are typically studied and evaluated as distinct legal 
topics so that law and technology analysis lacks overt coherence. To 
date, there are only nascent attempts to develop broader perspectives 
or theories that transcend this compartmentalization, and they tend to 
be dominated by instrumentalist approaches. A more balanced law and 
technology approach is needed to address recurring dilemmas where 
traditional approaches have been inadequate, such as the potential 
need for laws to ban, inhibit, or encourage new technology, and 
reducing uncertainty in the application of existing legal rules as 
applied to new practices. By complementing instrumentalist cyberlaw 
research with a more substantive approach, scholars are developing a 
richer dialogue on the role of law and technology in general. That 
richer dialogue should help inform policymakers so that they avoid 
possible over- or under-inclusiveness of existing legal rules as applied 
to new practices, and can help them to remedy the obsolescence of 
some existing rules. 
A substantivist approach helps us to understand how law and 
technology analysis and prescriptions can reinforce or subvert existing 
structures. Though an instrumentalism informed by economics has 
dominated legal research in law and technology, the fields of 
philosophy of technology, science and technology studies, and social 
studies of science are now mature enough to support rival approaches 
grounded in a deep understanding of the nature of, rather than results 
of, technological change. These approaches are helpful in generating 
                                                   
 198. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (resulting in an 8-1 
decision to uphold disclosure provisions of BCRA); see also Frank Pasquale, 
Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 
2008 ILL. L. REV. 599, 652-53 (being cited in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
451 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 199. See infra Part II. 
868 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
insights into analytical principles or guidelines and enriching the field 
of law and technology. 
A substantivist perspective supports what we call the digital 
persona model to signify the need for more holistic legal protection 
for autonomy within the online world (or digital biosphere) as an 
individual’s life becomes more interwoven with technology. In 
particular, a real world individual needs legal and policy assurances 
that his or her online journey is not being unduly manipulated or 
distorted by businesses or governments that are too frequently unseen 
and unaccountable. To reduce this risk, governments should, inter 
alia, pass laws to regulate and audit algorithms to detect and eliminate 
problematic software code that inhibits autonomy.  
